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Abstract:
This paper examines the potential impact of economic factors on withincountry violence and instability utilizing a panel data approach. More specifically,
this paper examines the impact of within-country income inequality on a measure
of political stability and a measure of within-country violence. Utilizing a
Generalized Least Squares method, this paper finds that only in countries with a
per-capita income less than $5000 is there a significant relationship between
income inequality and violence. This paper concludes with a discussion of the
results, recommendations for future research, and a section on policy
recommendations based on the empirical results and potential risks not explicitly
shown in the data.
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1.0 Introduction
Economics is fundamentally a science tasked with explaining and predicting human
behavior. Through incentives, resource channels, and institutions, economic forces perpetually
work to exert influence over everything within a society; from daily decision making to longterm development potential. While economic science is generally focused on explaining factors
and interactions that determine the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and
services, these same forces that determine resource use can be powerful influencers upon the
social fabric, state fragility, and ultimately interpersonal violence (Lee, 2016).
In recent decades, the world has experienced a significant decline in interstate violence.
However, violence that results from intrastate conflict and instability persists, expanding and
compounding existing tensions (Szayna et al., 2017). Although the immediate cause of violence
is political or social, economic forces are not free from these dynamics. Poverty, unemployment,
and inequality are often present in states where instability and violence are prevalent.
Inequality, in particular, has gained increased attention in recent years. The unmitigated
wave of globalization that has occurred over the past three decades has been credited with
increasing within-country inequality, despite increases in per-capita incomes. In addition to
structural economic changes as a result of globalization, within-country inequality has been a
predominant feature of many developing nations for decades preceding globalization’s advance.
In many cases, inequality has persisted as the result of antiquated institutions operating as lasting
vestiges of colonial or monarchical eras (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Central and South
America exhibit this history with clarity. Spanish and Portuguese colonial rule catalyzed the
initial institutional framework that guided early resource distribution and economic activity
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Into the 20th century, high levels of income inequality relative

to global averages were common throughout Central and South America, notably Colombia,
Chile, Venezuela, and Mexico (The World Bank, 2021).
Violence and unstable politics have similarly affected this region throughout history.
Political turmoil often turned violent throughout the 20th century. Ideological and narcoinsurgencies, as well as violent criminality, similarly thrived over the same period, and continue
to plague the region into recent years (Grillo, 2017). Over the past decade, the Northern Triangle
of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala have been noted for their rampant violence, and
Mexico continues to battle with similar challenges. Observing these trends, questions
surrounding an association between inequality and violence in Central and South America begin
to mount. Does inequality cause within-country violence? If not directly causing violence, does
inequality increase social fissures, leading to a greater propensity for instability or violence? This
paper seeks to answer these questions, adding to the existing literature and advancing
understanding of regional economic dynamics to chart a more prosperous path forward.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the
existing literature on the subject. Section 3 outlines regional trends impacting this paper’s
research question. Section 4 describes the data and empirical strategy. This paper is concluded by
Section 5 which discusses the model results, research limitations, and policy implications, as
well as recommendations for future research.

2.0 Literature Review
There has been extensive research within the economic and political literature examining
the interactions of inequality, instability, and violence. Aiming broadly, Thorbecke and
Charumilind (2002) describe the theoretical framework between inequality and economic
outcomes by invoking the unified model first put forward by Galor (2000). Once inequality’s

nature has been established, Thorbecke and Charumilind find the primary channels by which
inequality may influence political instability, and potential violence, is through 1.) relative
deprivation, or 2.) resource mobilization. Stewart (2002) aims to examine the root cause of
violent conflict in developing countries. In examining economic drivers, Stewart identifies the
Group Motivation Hypothesis, Private Motivation Hypothesis, Failure of the Social Contract,
and the Green War Hypothesis. In examining the empirical evidence, Stewart identifies group
inequality as a consistent explanatory variable of conflict in developing countries, although he
does not examine vertical distributions of resources at the individual level. Cramer (2003) again
asks the question regarding economic inequalities and intrastate conflict. His findings align with
Stewart’s (2002), concluding that economic inequality is hugely important to explaining civil
conflict when the economic is considered to be inseparable from the social, cultural, and
historical. Cramer (2003), like Stewart (2002), concludes that horizontal inequality causes civil
conflict, while vertical inequality, as captured by the Gini coefficient, does not.
However, differing perspectives on the vertical distribution of resources at the individual
level exist and exhibit robust empirical support. Alesina and Perotti (1995), utilizing a 71 country
sample from 1960 to 1985, find income inequality to exert a significant positive effect on
political instability. Nafziger and Auvinen (2002) find that high-income inequality can be a
source of instability via the increased probability of humanitarian emergencies. They base their
findings on the contribution of income inequality to absolute deprivation of portions of the
population, regardless of national growth rates. They also find that income inequality, through
the demonstration effect of consumption levels of the relatively well off, increases perceptions of
relative deprivation, even in the absence of absolute deprivation, increasing the risk of political
disintegration.

Though there is evidence that income inequality contributes to within-state instability
(Alesina and Perotti (1995), Nafziger and Auvinen (2002)), empirical links to violence also
demonstrate the effects of high levels of inequality. Rashad et al. (2018) examine the relationship
between income inequality and interpersonal violence, namely violence against women, utilizing
the 2005-2006 National Family Health Survey of India. Using a variety of regression techniques,
they find that income inequality was significant in increasing the risk of violence on individuals.
Similarly, Jacobs and Richardson (2008), utilizing a fixed-effect panel data approach, find
evidence in support of relative deprivation theory, where levels of income inequality are
significantly associated with homicides in developed democracies. Their analysis also points to
the role of young males as a contributor to increased violence risk. Similar results are found by
Enamorado et al. (2015), who employ a panel data approach to examine the effects of inequality
on homicide rates across municipalities in Mexico. Their estimates indicate a significant positive
relationship between income inequality and the homicide rate between 1990 and 2010, with
results being robust across regression techniques. Utilizing a cross-country approach with a
sample of 165 countries in 2010, Ouimet (2012) finds evidence that income inequality is a
significant predictor of the homicide rate in all countries. Ouimet (2012), through subsample
analysis, also finds that income inequality is the strongest predictor of homicide rates for
countries with a medium level of human development. Further evidence is given by Poveda’s
(2011) analysis of homicides in Colombian cities. Utilizing several panel data approaches,
Poveda (2011) finds that income inequality is a significant predictor of homicides across seven
Colombian cities, and historical data indicates a significant positive relationship between income
inequality and homicide.

2.1 Theoretical Framework:
Based on the conclusions of the above-mentioned empirical literature, this paper utilizes
the following theoretical framework as the basis for its empirical examination. First, this paper
suspects that higher levels of income inequality tend to exert increased pressure on social
structures, exacerbating existing social fissures and opening new ones, via relative deprivation
channels at both the individual and group levels. The tendency of humans to grant greater
concern over relative status than absolute status provides support for this linkage of economic
and social dynamics (Frank, 2000). Second, through these social fissures, there now exists an
increased propensity for deviations from the norms of political processes and increased withincountry violence, as discontent grows among individuals and groups seeing widenings disparities
among the “haves” and “have-nots”. Through this framework, it is assumed that the higher the
level of income inequality, the greater the effect of social fracturing, and the greater the potential
for instability and violence. This relationship is theorized to operate in a linear fashion, ceteris
parabis.

3.0 Regional Trends
Figure 1: Income Inequality by Gini Coefficient, 2000-2017 1

Figure 2: Homicide Deaths per 100,000, 1990-2017

1

Inequality data (Gini Coefficient) is largely missing prior to 1999 in the observed sample.
2000-2017 series range allows for general trend overview.

Figure 3: Conflict and Terrorism-Related Deaths, 1990-2017

Figure 4: Regional State Fragility, 2006-2018 2
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4.0 Data and Empirical Methodology:
The data for this research is derived from a variety of international development
organizations. The regional sample is constructed from twenty-one Central and South American
nation-states 3. The data is oriented on an annualized time series range of 2000-2018. The
dependent variable STAB is an index value representing state stability and security. This variable
is valued between -2.5 and 2.5, with the lower values indicating greater instability and higher
values indicating greater stability. Data for STAB was collected from the Political Stability and
Absence of Violence/Terrorism Estimate of the World Bank Governance Indicators. Similarly,
the dependent variable VIOL is a value of within-country violence and is a measure of homicide
deaths per 100,000. The independent variable INEQ is the Gini coefficient per country as a
measure of within-country income inequality. The independent variable GDPPC is a measure of
gross domestic product per capita by country of observation (Constant 2010 Dollars).
UNEMPLOY is the proportion of a country’s labor force that is unemployed. CPI is a measure of
inflation by consumer price index, with 2010 operating as a base year (Value= 100). POV is a
measure of multidimensional poverty per country as a proportion of the total population. YMPOP
is a measure of the male population under the age of 25 as a proportion of the total population.
Data for variables VIOL, INEQ, GDPPC, UNEMPLOY, CPI, POV, and YMPOP were collected
from The World Bank World Development Indicators.

3

Belize, Cuba, and Suriname are omitted from this sample, despite being within the region of
interest. These states do not have available data that would allow for proper estimation within the
larger sample.

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Figure 5: Gini – Stability Index Plot
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Figure 6: Gini – Homicide Plot
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Figure 5 represents plotted observations between measures of income inequality and
political instability. By this chart, no clear relationship is observable. However, there do appear
to be two loosely connected groupings of observations, separated by the zero points of the
stability index. Figure 6 represents a plotting of data between income inequality and homicide
deaths, with a general upward trend of homicides detected as inequality levels increase. Like
Figure 5, there also appear to be two distinct groupings of data points, with the Figure 6
groupings separated around the 25 homicides per 100,000 mark. The possible existence of two
distinct observation groups is noted and is included in a reexamination of the modeling strategy
described later.

4.1 General Models
The general multivariate regression models used by this paper are as follows,
STABit = αit + β1IINit + β2GDPpcit + β3UNEMPit + β4POVit + β5CPIit +

β6MPOPit + εit

VIOLit = αit + β1IINit + β2GDPpcit + β3UNEMPit + β4POVit + β5CPIit

+β6MPOPit + εit

4.2 Disaggregated Models:
However, based on differences in observations found in the dataset, it is suspected that
there is an income-per-capita threshold in which relationships between variables are altered.
Therefore, the models are disaggregated into Low-Middle Income and Middle-Income groups.
As a result of the disaggregation being along a per capita income threshold, the independent
variable GDPPC is omitted.

LMISTABit = αit + β1IINit + β2UNEMPit + β3POVit + β4CPIit + β5MPOPit + εit
MISTABit = αit + β1IINit + β2UNEMPit + β3POVit + β4CPIit + β5MPOPit + εit
LMIVIOLit = αit + β1IINit + β2UNEMPit + β3POVit + β4CPIit + β5MPOPit + εit
MIVIOLit = αit + β1IINit + β2UNEMPit + β3POVit + β4CPIit + β5MPOPit + εit

5.0 Results
To test the general models, this paper utilizes fixed effects and random effects
Generalized Least Squares techniques. The results of the general model analysis are listed below.
Aggregate Model Results:
Table 2: Stability Fixed Effects and Random Effects

Table 3: Violence Fixed Effects and Random Effects:

The results of the general model, shown in Table 2 and Table 3, fail to find any
significant relationship between income inequality and political stability or violence. The results
of Figure 7 and Figure 8 provide levels of significance and signs that fail to reject the null
hypothesis of this examination utilizing both fixed and random effects approaches. Seeing the
little utility in these results, this paper invokes the disaggregated models listed above to account
for differences in state development by per capita income levels.

Disaggregated Model Results:
Table 4: Disaggregated Stability GLS (Random Effects):

Table 5: Disaggregated Violence GLS (Random Effects):

The results provided by the disaggregated models are mixed. First, as mentioned in the
Data section of this paper, analysis of the dataset suspects there to be two distinct groupings of
observations operating around certain thresholds. When including per-capita income, as
measured by GDPPC, into this analysis, data behavior becomes clearer. There is a per-capita
income threshold that separates data behavior within this dataset. This threshold is found to be
roughly $5000, close to The World Bank’s defined separation of Low-Middle Income and
Middle-Income states by a GNI per capita threshold of $4,045. Therefore, the data set is

separated into two distinct sets. Observations, where per capita income is below $5000, are
included in the Low-Middle Income Group. Observations, where per capita income is above
$5000, are included in the Middle-Income Group. The separated groupings are then analyzed
through Generalized Least Squares for both Political Stability and Violence models. Table 4
shows the results of the Disaggregated Political Stability Model. The results shown in Table 4
failed to find a significant relationship between income inequality and political stability within
the Low-Middle Income Group. However, there is a statistically significant, positive,
relationship found between income inequality and political stability in the Middle-Income group.
Table 5 shows the results of the Disaggregated Violence Model. For the Middle-Income
group, this model finds a statistically significant, negative relationship between income
inequality and violence. However, the results of the Low-Middle Income Group find a
significant, positive relationship between income inequality and violence. A result confirming
the theoretical framework listed above.

5.1 Limitations:
This paper identifies three major limitations of its examination. First, concerns regarding
the use of index data are merited in this case. The variable STAB has an inequality measure
included in its calculation. This adds collinearity issues to model estimation. Although the
primary conclusions of this paper are not derived from the model utilizing STAB, the use of
index data with an included inequality aspect may limit the accuracy of the model’s results. A
second limitation of this paper is the use of the Gini Coefficient as a measure of income
inequality. Although the Gini Coefficient is the traditional indicator of the income distribution,
specific data on income held by the top .01%, 1%, 10% of earners could yield much higher
quality results, adding to the accuracy of this paper’s estimation. A final limitation of this paper

is the limited availability of quality data in observed countries. Much of the data collected over
the observed periods included long gaps, necessitating the estimation of data points.
Furthermore, large gaps in the data of higher quality indicators demanded the use of less-optimal
control variables (Ex: the use of multi-dimensional poverty rather than poverty at national
poverty lines, which would have been a better indicator of relative poverty within specific
countries).

5.2 Conclusion:
The purpose of this paper was to examine the relationship between income inequality and
political instability and violence in Central and South America. Based on the results of this
paper’s estimation, only in Central and South American states with a per-capita income less than
$5000 is income inequality a significant predictor of violence. Due to the mixed nature of this
paper’s results, future research should include the following: 1.) The impact of wealth
distribution, 2.) The use of inequality vectors, and 3.) Examinations of inequality perceptions.
First, Unequal wealth distribution is also prevalent in the observed region. The result of a long
history of exploitative institutions and pervasive corruption and cronyism. The impact of wealth
inequality on political stability and violence should be explored for a more comprehensive
understanding of the relationship between economic inequalities and violence. Second, while this
paper only utilizes a single measure of inequality, future research should explore the use of
multi-measure inequality vectors to gain a holistic view of inequalities' nature as it relates to
instability and violence in developing states. Third, and most importantly, the role of inequality
perceptions should be explored going forward. Stewart (2002) highlights the importance of
perceptions in his analysis of inequality and violence. Due to the mixed results of this paper, it is
possible that high levels of income inequality do not directly cause increased instability or

violence. Rather, it is the recognition of unequal distributions that cause instability and violence.
If this is the case, such a relationship would require some sort of social catalyst for existing
inequalities to trigger social fractures. If high levels of inequality are present in a state, but the
popular perception does not provide it recognition, then social fissures fail to materialize. It is
possible that only when popular perceptions acknowledge high levels of inequality that social
fracturing occurs, resulting in an increased potential for instability and violence.

5.3 Policy Implications and Recommendations:
The results of this paper provide insight into potential political and social risks in lowmiddle income countries, specifically in Latin America, because of high levels of income
inequality. Although both income inequality and measures of violence have, on average, been
decreasing in the region over the past fifteen years, close attention should be paid to income
distribution dynamics within low-middle income countries. This paper’s empirical analysis
concludes that greater income inequality is associated with higher levels of violence, as
measured by homicides per 100,000, in states with a per capita income below $5000. If
suspicions regarding perceptions of inequality, as described above, are substantiated, then higher
levels of income inequality, and economic inequalities generally, may increase the systemic risk
level of developing states, leading to a greater potential for harsh deviations from political norms
and processes, and higher levels of violence. Many of the states in the observed region, and
around the world, face significant challenges to their sustainable development, including
corruption, health, and education disparities, and poverty. Without broad increases in standards
of living, increases in income inequality could add to existing social pressures, increasing the
potential for social fracturing and violence. The rapid rise of political movements that alter
prevailing sentiment regarding economic development, social structure, or resource distributions

could act as catalyzing agents toward social fracturing and violence. A conversion of potential
risk to material and physical harm. Therefore, as mentioned above, close attention must be paid
to income distributions within developing countries to minimize potential risks to sustainable
development.
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